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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax treaties represent a highly developed area of international
cooperation. Few fields come to mind in which international
groups have worked so consistently for so long. The model treaties
produced through these efforts - by, for example, the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development - constitute ma-
jor achievements. Indeed, one is tempted to address questions in
the area by referring only to the treaty materials that exist today,
including the U.S. model treaties, and to review outstanding policy
issues simply by comparing models and discussing their differ-
ences. The existing models do not, however, speak to the question
of what tax treaty policy might be. Because they reflect more than
half a century of experience among nations, the models tend to
assume answers to some fundamental questions.
These fundamental questions are: What is the purpose of tax
treaties? Are bilateral treaties the optimum means of carrying out
those purposes? Is the basic approach employed by existing models
the best form of bilateral agreement? A serious review of United
States tax treaty policy must begin with these questions. Accord-
ingly, the first part of this article describes the history of interna-
tional efforts to achieve "tax harmonization". This part ends with
a summary of the highlights of the OECD model income tax treaty,
which forms the essential basis of current United States tax treaty
policy.
The second part of the article focuses upon the United States
experience: (1) our treaties currently in force; (2) the present U.S.
model income tax treaty and its differences from the OECD model;
and (3) the major "collateral" issues which are of significance in
current negotiations. Because most of the attention in the field is
focused on income taxation, estate and gift tax treaties are not dis-
cussed. This omission should not be taken as downplaying the sig-
nificant activities currently underway with respect to such treaties.
In concluding, the discussion shifts to the overall "manage-
ment" of the tax treaty program; the process of designing and
modifying the U.S. model; how this country selects negotiation
partners; the bargaining process involved in treaty negotiations;
the implementation of a treaty once it enters into force; and the
degree of public participation in the treaty process.
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II. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE TAX HARMONIZATION
A. The Antecedents
What we now call "direct" taxes - taxes imposed directly on
income or property - did not come into widespread use until the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. From the first,
states imposed such taxes on a dual basis, sometimes taxing be-
cause of a relationship to the person (e.g., because he was a resi-
dent of the state), sometimes because of a relationship to the prop-
erty or income (e.g., because the property was located in the state's
territory). This dual basis of taxation obviously created a potential
for two states to claim a right to impose the same kind of tax on
the same base. But in early times this did not generally pose a
practical problem, because international commerce was not highly
developed and tax rates were relatively modest.
Double taxation was a problem, however, for states that were
closely connected by language, history, or custom, and for political
subdivisions of the same state. Quite frequently, in these situa-
tions, important commercial relations were threatened by direct
taxes imposed on a dual basis. These situations gave rise to the
earliest forms of "tax harmonization" laws and interstate or inter-
national tax agreements, particularly among the Germanic states
of Central Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
During and shortly after World War I, double taxation became
a matter of worldwide significance. Rates of direct taxation, partic-
ularly income taxation, were increasing, as was the volume of inter-
national business. In the United States, this led to the enactment,
in the Revenue Act of 1918,1 of provisions embodying a "foreign
tax credit", which allowed a deduction from the U.S. income tax
for amounts paid to foreign governments as income taxes.2 In 1920,
a conference of representatives of most members of the League of
Nations recommended to the League's Financial Committee that it
study international double taxation and recommend means of alle-
viating it.
A 1923 report3 commissioned by the League from four econo-
1. Act of February 24, 1919, § 222, 238, 40 Stat. 1057.
2. The allowable "foreign tax credit" was limited in the next revenue act, the Revenue
Act of 1921, to an amount equal to the U.S. tax attributable to the taxpayer's foreign in-
come. Act of November 23, 1921, §§ 222(a)(5), 238(a), 42 Stat. 227.
3. Report on Double Taxation, submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors
Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F 19,
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mists, from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands and Italy,4 discussed the economic consequences of interna-
tional double taxation; the principles governing the competence of
states to impose taxes on "international" property or income; and
the application of those principles in developing technical means of
eliminating double taxation. For the first point - the economic
analysis - the economists used the model of a tax imposed in an
"origin" or source country which supplements a pre-existing tax
imposed by the country of the investor's "residence". They con-
cluded that the principal consequence of such a tax for pre-ex-
isting investments was a diminution of the value of the investment,
and thus a penalty on the foreign investor. With respect to new
investments, the tax was not a burden on the investor, since it
would be discounted in making the investment and the investor
could, if necessary, forego the investment altogether. Rather, the
"penalty" was ultimately-on the source state itself, or its consum-
ers: the tax would raise the rate of return that an investor would
demand before investing in that state. The "double" tax was, in
effect, a protective tariff on the importation of capital into the
source state.5
In regard to international competence to tax, the economists
described two broad principles of modern direct taxation: "ability
to pay" and "economic allegiance".6 The first point was simply
that taxpayers should bear their share of the burden of govern-
ment revenue needs in proportion to their ability to pay. The prob-
lem posed by this concept in an international context was identify-
ing the group of persons whose ability to pay should be taken into
account in allocating tax burdens. The economists concluded that
this group should comprise those persons who owed the taxing
power "economic allegiance" with respect to the property or in-
come being taxed.7
Four elements of economic allegiance were identified: (1)
where wealth originated; (2) where wealth, once produced, was
kept; (3) where laws that created or protected enforceable rights to
wealth existed; (4) where wealth was consumed, disposed of or en-
joyed.8 The economists then discussed the implications of "eco-
reprinted in League of Nations Publications, 11 Economic and Financial (No. 28) (1923).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 7, 8.
7. Id. at 18-22.
8. Id. at 20.
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nomic allegiance" for the rights of states to tax different categories
of wealth or income.
With respect to wealth derived from land,9 the state where the
land was located was the dominant factor in production; the land,
of course, remained in the source state; that state's laws ordinarily
protected rights to land; and therefore that state, as opposed to the
state of the owner's residence, had a predominant right to tax.
With respect to wealth derived from business property having a
fixed location,10 and from personal property having a close relation
to land,1 the considerations were similiar to those involved in the
case of land and, consequently, the analysis favored the right of
the source state to tax. Regarding wealth derived from tangible
personal property not closely tied to land,12 source or situs often
played little part in the value of the property, and was in fact often
determined arbitrarily; the state of the owner's residence, where
the property was presumably enjoyed and where rights in the
property were usually enforced, enjoyed the predominant claim to
"economic allegiance".
With respect to wealth derived from a category of property
identified as "corporeal movables not ordinarily capable of a fixed
location"13 - principally ships - the dominant claim to tax was
ascribed to the state of registry, on the ground that that was the
state which enforced property rights (the source state was fre-
quently difficult to identify). Wealth derived from intangible prop-
erty14 was analyzed under principles similar to those used in the
context of tangible personal property: the result was a decision
favoring the primacy of the residence state, except in the case of
real property mortgages, which were deemed akin to land. Finally,
regarding earnings and salaries, 15 the residence state had virtually
sole claim to "economic allegiance".
The report discussed four methods of avoiding double taxa-
tion. The first would unilaterally concede the primary right to tax
to the source state.16 The second would concede exclusive taxing
authority to the residence state through exemption in the state of
9. Id. at 22-24.
10. Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 32.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 34.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Id. at 42.
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source. 17 The third was a "proportionate division" method - di-
viding taxes between two states according to some predetermined
formula.18 The fourth method was "classification and assignment"
- classifying income according to type and assigning primary
rights to tax certain types of income to one state and other types
to the other.1 9 In formulating recommendations, the economists
ruled out methods which accorded primary or exclusive taxing
rights to the sburce state, largely on the ground that this would be
contrary to modern progressive taxation based upon an "ability to
pay" principle.2 0 Approaches based on proportionate division and
classification and assignment were also rejected, because the econ-
omists judged the theoretical problems involved in these ap-
proaches to be too great.2 1 Their preference was for the second
method - exemption by the source state of nonresidents' income
- both because it avoided theoretical complexities and because it
accorded with what they viewed as economic reality: the source
state should cede the right to tax when it sought investment from
abroad.22 To the objection that this method would create an unbal-
anced treatment of "creditor" and "debtor" countries - the
method would involve a substantial revenue sacrifice by the latter
- the economists responded with a proposal to divide revenues
based upon the relative magnitude of the different types of income
deemed to have originated in each state. The taxpayer would not
be affected.2
In 1925 a Committee of Technical Experts organized by the
League issued a further report on problems of double taxation.2'
This report distinguished between "impersonal" taxes - schedular
taxes or taxes imposed on different types of income - and "per-
sonal" taxes, that is, global taxes imposed on total income.2 With
respect to personal taxes, the Experts recommended that the state
of domicile be accorded a right to impose a tax on all income.2




20. Id. at 48.
21. Id. at 45.
22. Id. at 48.
23. Id. at 49.
24. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts on Double Taxation
and Tax Evasion to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of Nations
Doc. C.115. M.55. 1925 H (1925).
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. Id. Resolution 1[ at 32.
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signed a right to tax income from real property and from agricul-
tural, commercial and industrial undertakings.27 When such dual
taxation occurred, "relief' would be given in the form of a reduc-
tion of tax, calculated according to prescribed formulae, in the
state of residence.
The report of the Technical Experts also addressed, for the
first time, the problem of international tax evasion. On the basis of
the few existing arrangements between countries, the Committee
concluded that "supply. . . [of] information. . . required for tax
assessment" represented the best approach to combatting such
291evasion.
In 1927 the Technical Experts issued the first international
draft model treaties: a model imcome tax treaty, a model covering
succession duties, and a model governing administrative assistance
in the collection of taxes.30 These were followed in 1928 by five
models issued by a General Meeting of Government Experts con-
vened by the League to discuss the 1927 models. Three of these
1928 models were separate income tax models - one for use be-
tween states which employed both "personal" and "impersonal"
income tax systems;31 a second for use between states wishing to
cover only personal tax systems;32 and a third covering exclusively
impersonal tax systems.33 The 1928 models provided the frame-
work for the negotiation of a wide network of tax treaties, particu-
larly among European nations. The models also served as a frame-
work for the earliest United States tax treaties.
From the foregoing review it is clear that the fundamental pol-
icy questions in the tax treaty area that are mentioned in the in-
troduction to this article were addressed at an early date. The first
question - what tax treaties are intended to achieve - was con-
sidered in the first report of the economists: double taxation repre-
sents an unfair burden on existing investment and an arbitrary
barrier to the free flow of international capital, goods and persons.
Nations should therefore seek to eliminate - or at least alleviate
27. Id. Resolution I (II) at 32.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 34.
30. Report Presented by the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and
Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doe. C.216 M.85. 1927 H (1927).
31. Report Presented by the General Meeting Of Government Experts on Double Tax-
ation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doe. C.562 M.178 1928 H, Draft Convention No.
Ia at 7 (1928).
32. Id. Draft Convention No. Ib at 16.
33. Id. Draft Convention No. Ic at 19.
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- these undesirable consequences of double taxation.34 The sec-
ond question concerned the choice of bilateral approaches to elimi-
nating double taxation. The early work of the League 5 revealed
the justification for bilateral approaches. Multilateral agreement is
difficult when countries are in different legal or economic circum-
stances: unilateral measures, on the other hand, are almost inevita-
bly ineffectual. After the first international models were issued, the
Hoover Administration proposed modifications of the U.S. revenue
laws under which the United States would have exempted all but
realty and business income of any foreign person if that person's
state of residence granted reciprocal treatment. 6 The measure was
never enacted, but it is doubtful that it would have worked: foreign
investment by U.S. persons at the time was some four times
greater than investment by foreign persons in the United States.3 7
Most countries would probably not have absorbed the revenue sac-
rifice involved in granting the reciprocal exemption envisioned by
the proposal.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the League's work was
its ultimate choice of "classification and assignment" as the basic
structure for a model bilateral agreement. 8 This structure is used
today in virtually all tax treaties. While the League chose "classifi-
cation and assignment" because of the differences between
"debtor" and "creditor" countries, the approach has been used
even between countries which believe that debits and credits be-
tween them are more or less in balance. The principal drawback of
this method is the resultant need to classify and assign taxation
rights during negotiations on an item-by-item basis.
In addition, the "economic allegiance" principle articulated in
the League's work is the basis for most of the substantive rules -
the actual classifications and assignments - in modern tax trea-
ties. Real property income and income connected with a fixed busi-
ness location are still the kinds for which the right to tax is most
readily accorded to the source state.3 9 Passive investment income
34. See note 3 supra.
35. See note 31 supra.
36. H.R. 10165, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 72 CONG. REC. 4095 (1930).
37. A Bill to Reduce International Double Taxation: Hearings on H.R. 10165 before
the Committee on Ways and Means, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930) at 37.
38. Model Bilateral Conventions for the Prevention of International Double Taxation
and Fiscal Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.2.M.2. 1945. II. A. (1945), reprinted in Man-
ual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Coun-
tries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/94, at 161-64 (1979).
39. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Convention
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remains the kind which under international practice is most com-
monly reserved to the owner's state of residence. 0
B. The Work of International Organizations Since 1928
At the conclusion of its work, the General Meeting of Govern-
ment Experts recommended that the League appoint a permanent
Fiscal Committee to monitor the development of an international
network of tax treaties. The most significant product of this Com-
mittee's early work was a model treaty approved in 1934 governing
the attribution of profits among different components of an inte-
grated enterprise operating in different states.4 1 This model set
forth for the first time an international "arm's-length" standard -
that profits should be attributed to different components as if they
were entirely separate enterprises dealing with each other at arm's
length.
In 1943, the Fiscal Committee sponsored meetings in Mexico
City which drafted new international models governing income and
estate taxes and administrative assistance in collection. 42 These
"Mexico models" were substantially more detailed and precise
than the 1928 models. Another series of meetings was held in
London under the Fiscal Committee's auspices in 1946: a model
income tax treaty similar to but more refined than the 1943 Mex-
ico model was drafted.43 Rules governing the double taxation of
capital were introduced. 4
In 1956, acting at the urging of the international business
community, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation
(OEEC) - an entity devoted to the study and resolution of inter-
state economic problems faced by European nations - formed a
Fiscal Committee and charged it with the task of exploring the
possibility of achieving a uniform multilateral treaty for the avoid-
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, re-
printed in [Current Binder] 1 TAx TRATmS (CCH) 1 151 [hereinafter cited as OECD
Model].
40. See id. arts. 10-13.
41. League of Nations Fiscal Committee, Report of the Fourth Session of the Commit-
tee, League of Nations Doc. No. C.339 M.204.1933.II.A (June 26, 1933). A revision of this
convention was published by the Committee in League of Nations Fiscal Committee, Report
of the Fifth Session of the Committee, League of Nations Doc. No. C.252.M.124.1935.Il.A
(1935).
42. London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions-Commentary and Text, League of
Nations Doc. No. C.88.M.88. 1946.II.A (1946) [hereinafter cited as London and Mexico
Models].
43. Id.
44. The rules governing double taxation of capital are set forth in id. art. XV.
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ance of double taxation. In its first report, in July of 1958, the Fis-
cal Committee recognized that the task of preparing a multilateral
treaty was, of necessity, a long one: it proposed first to issue a se-
ries of articles aiming toward a "Model Bilateral Convention ac-
ceptable to all Member countries."'45
The OEEC Fiscal Committee proceededto issue 30 articles in
five installments, which were then collected as a model treaty in
1963.46 Meanwhile, in 1961, the OEEC was re-constituted as the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), with the addition of the United States and Canada as
members. Other developed non-European countries, including Ja-
pan, Australia and New Zealand, have joined the organization.
The 1963 OECD Model income tax treaty was accompanied by
lengthy and elaborate commentaries which explained particular
provisions. The commentaries also indicated matters not addressed
in the model which might be covered in particular negotiations; the
relationship of the model to the London and Mexico models, as
well as the early work of the League; and the relationship of the
model to prevailing practices of member states.
The OECD followed this work with the publication in 1966 of
a comparable model estate tax treaty.47 In August 1977, the OECD
issued a revised model income tax treaty,48 with revised commenta-
ries, both updated in light of the experience of member and non-
member states in working with the provisions of the 1963 model.
Currently, the OECD is endeavoring to revise the 1966 estate tax
model, to incorporate into that model provisions respecting gift
taxes, and to produce a new model governing reciprocal adminis-
trative assistance in tax matters.
The OECD efforts were principally directed at tax treaty ne-
gotiations between developed countries. Shortly after completion
of the first OECD model, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council instituted efforts to develop principles for negotiations be-
45. FiscAL CommrTE oF THE O.E.E.C., 1ST REPORT, THE ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE
TAXATION 16-17 (1958).
46. Id.; FISCAL COMMITTEE OF THE O.E.E.C., 2D REPORT, THE ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE
TAXATION (1959); FiscAL COMMrTE OF THE O.E.E.C., 3D REPORT, THE ELIMINATION OF
DOUBLE TAXATION (1960); FiscAL COMMTrE OF THE O.E.E.C., 4TH REPORT, THE ELIMINA-
TION OF DOUBLE TAXATION (1961). The text of the 1963 model appears in FiscAL COMMIT=
OF THE O.E.C.D., 5TH REPORT, THE ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION 35-58 (1963) [herein-
after cited as 1963 OECD Model].
47. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Draft Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, re-
printed in 1 TAX TREATiES (CCH) 152.
48. OECD Model, supra note 39.
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tween developed and developing countries. In 1967, the Council
adopted a resolution expressing the view that tax treaties between
developed and developing countries could serve to promote the
flow of productive investment to the latter and noting that, despite
the widespread proliferation of treaties between developed coun-
tries, there were still very few treaties between developed and de-
veloping countries.4 The Council therefore requested the Secre-
tary General to establish an ad hoc group of experts to study the
problem of tax treaties between developed and developing coun-
tries and to recommend guidelines for the negotiation of such
treaties.50
The experts come from both developed and developing coun-
tries. They are recommended by their governments, but serve in
their private capacities rather than as representatives of their gov-
ernments. Since 1968, the group has met on a regular basis and has
issued eight reports on its work to the Secretary General;5 1 the re-
ports provide a comprehensive discussion of the kind of problems
raised by developed-developing country treaties. In 1974 the group
issued preliminary guidelines for negotiations, 52 which were super-
seded in 1979 by the issuance of a manual containing a new set of
guidelines. 5 s The group intends to issue, in the near future, a
model developed-developing country treaty representing a refine-
ment of the guidelines set forth in the 1979 manual.
C. The 1977 OECD Model
The OECD model can best be described by a brief summary of
its principal categories of rules.
1. Scope
All income taxes of the contracting states are covered, includ-
ing taxes imposed by local authorities and political subdivisions.54
49. E.S.L. Res. 1273, 43 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. E/4429 (1967).
50. Id.
51. First Report, U.N. Doc. E/4614 ST/ECA110 (1969); Second Report, U.N. Doc. E/
4936 ST/ECA137 (1970); Third Report, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/166 (1972); Fourth Report,
U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/188 (1973); Fifth Report, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/18 (1975); Sixth Report,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/42 (1976); Seventh Report, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/79 (1978); Eighth Report,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/101 (1980).
52. Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Guidelines].
53. Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and De-
veloping Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/94 (1979).
54. OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 2(1).
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Capital taxes are also covered, and a separate article is devoted to
such taxes.5 Coverage extends to residents of one or both of the
contracting states.5 It does not generally extend to cases where
both states claim a right to tax on a source basis, or to cases where
one state taxes on the basis of citizenship.
2. Classes of Income
Real property and permanent establishment income. The
OECD model retains the League principle that the source state
should have the right to tax real property income.8 However, the
model assimilates mortgage income to interest, not real property
income.5 9 The model also allows a source state to tax business in-
come fully if such income is attributable to a permanent establish-
ment in the source state.6 0 This rule also descends from the early
League work, but is now subject to exceptions which have evolved
over time; moreover, there are special provisions for cases where
business is conducted through an agent, providing for insulation
from source basis taxation where the agent is independent and al-
lowing source taxation if the agent is dependent but conducts sig-
nificant business on behalf of the enterprise.6 1 The allocation rules
used in these provisions explicitly rely upon the "arm's length"
principle.6 2 A special exemption for international transportation
income grants exclusive taxation rights to the state where the
"place of effective management" of the enterprise is located.63
Passive investment income. With respect to dividends and in-
terest, the OECD model adopts the device of a limited or partial
right to tax at source." Dividends may generally be taxed by the
source state at a rate no higher than fifteen percent:6 5 if, however,
the payee is a corporation controlling more than twenty-five per-
cent of the payor's capital, the maximum source tax rate is reduced
to five percent.66 This special reduction is designed to harmonize
55. Id. art. 22.
56. Id. art. 1.
57. Id. arts. 23A, 23B.
58. Id. arts. 6, 13, 22.
59. Id. art. 11(3).
60. Id. arts. 5, 7.
61. Id. arts. 5(5), 5(6).
62. See notes 60-61 supra.
63. Id. art. 8.
64. Id. arts. 10, 11.
65. Id. art. 10(2)(b).
66. Id. art. 10(2)(a).
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with features of the laws of many states giving relief from double
coporate-level taxation of intercorporate distributions. The interest
article reserves to the source state a right to tax at a maximum
rate of ten percent of the interest payment.6 7 The royalty article
provides for reciprocal exemption of royalties at source.68
With respect to capital gains, the model generally reserves the
right to tax to the state of residence 6 -with the exception of prop-
erty closely associated with the source state - land and perma-
nent establishment business property.70 Taxation of gains from the
disposition of ships and aircraft used in international operations is
reserved to the state in which the effective management of the en-
terprise is located.7'
Personal service income. The general rule in the OECD model
is that personal service income is taxable in the state where the
services are performed;7 2 but there is also a variety of special rules.
With respect to "dependent" services, the state of residence has
exclusive taxing rights as long as the taxpayer was present in the
other state for less than half of the taxable year and was not work-
ing under conditions such that the other state would likely be
obliged to allow a deduction for his salary.73 "Independent" ser-
vices, on the other hand, are taxable only to the extent that they
are connected to a "fixed base" in the source state7' - a concept
which parallels the permanent establishment criterion used for de-
termining when business profits may be taxed at source. Directors'
fees are taxable in the source state - that is, the state of the pay-
ing corporation's residence.75 Artists' and athletes' income is inva-
riably subject to taxation in the state where the personal services
are rendered;76 and if the income from such services is deflected to
another person, that person may be taxed in the source state irre-
spective of whether he has a permanent establishment or fixed
base there.7 7 Pensions are taxable only in the state of residence;78
income from government service generally in the state paying the
67. Id. art. 11(2).
68. Id. art. ,12.
69. Id. arts. 13(4), 22(4).
70. Id. arts. 13(1), 13(2), 22(1), 22(2).
71. Id. arts. 13(3), 22(3).
72. Id. arts. 14, 15.
73. Id. art. 15.
74. Id. art. 14(1).
75. Id. art. 16.
76. Id. art. 17(1).
77. Id. art. 17(2).
78. Id. art. 18.
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income; 9 and a special provision exempts payments to students for
their maintenance, education or training.80
Nonclassified income. The OECD model ultimately recognizes
the primacy of the resident state in two ways. First, unclassified
income not specifically covered in the model is taxable exclusively
by that state.81 Second, a residual right to tax is generally accorded
to the state of residence even when the primary right to tax is
granted to the source state.82 The residence state is required to
bear the burden of eliminating double taxation for any income as-
signed to the source state;8  but it may tax the income in full if the
source state does not tax it, or does not tax it at a level equal to
that of the residence state.8
3. Double Taxation Provisions
The OECD model provides for alternative methods of avoiding
double taxation. The first, .the "ordinary credit" method, 5 is pat-
terned on the United States foreign tax credit provisions.8 6 The
residence state allows a reduction of its tax for that paid to the
other state, but is not required to allow a greater reduction than an
amount bearing the same proportion to its total tax as the amount
of income which the source state is allowed to tax bears to the tax-
payer's total income.87 The second method, "exemption with pro-
gression", requires the residence state to exempt the income which
the source state may tax, but permits it to determine its tax on the
remaining income at a progressive rate which takes account of the
income taxable by the source state. 8
4. Other Provisions
Nondiscrimination. This provision forbids states from dis-
criminating against nationals of the other state in tax matters -
guaranteeing the principle of "national treatment".8 9 Nondiscrimi-
nation provisions were common in tax treaties from an early pe-
79. Id. art. 19.
80. Id. art. 20.
81. Id. art. 21(1).
82. Id. art. 23A(3).
83. Id. arts. 23A(1), 23A(2).
84. Id. art. 23A(3).
85. Id. art. 23B(1).
86. I.R.C. §§ 901-908.
87. OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 23B(2).
88. Id. art. 24(1).
89. Id. art. 24.
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riod, but the 1963 OECD mode 90 introduced two novel forms of
such provisions. The first forbids discrimination against a "perma-
nent establishment" of a national of the other state.91 The second
prohibits discrimination against an enterprise based on the fact
that its capital is owned in substantial part by nationals of the
other state.92
Exchange of information. The OECD model contains rela-
tively liberal exchange-of-information provisions which, however,
include limitations deriving from the early work of the League: the
restriction to information in the requested state's possession or
available under its laws;'- and a guarantee that a requested state
need not take steps contrary to its security, sovereignty, or public
policy.94
Mutual agreement procedure. The Model provides a mecha-
nism for the resolution of disputes; each state designates a "com-
petent authority" who serves as its representative for interpreting
and implementing the treaty.9 5 The model provides for consulta-
tion among competent authorities, but does not require that they
come to an agreement; nor does it provide any mechanism for
binding them to a decision." The procedure is supplementary to
others, including recourse to the courts, which are available to a
taxpayer under domestic law. 9
II. UNITED STATES TREATY POLICY
A. Existing United States Treaties
The United States presently has thirty independently negoti-
ated income treaties in force. Several of these have been extended
to territories of the treaty partner, and in some instances these ter-
ritories have since become independent and assumed their obliga-
tions under the treaty. While a comprehensive review of U.S. trea-
ties is not possible here, a general survey may be useful.
In part because U.S. treaties have been heavily influenced by
the international models outstanding at the time of their negotia-
tion, and in. part because they have been influenced by develop-
90. 1963 OECD Model, supra note 46.
91. OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 24(4).
92. Id. art. 24(6).
93. Id. art. 26(2)(b).
94. Id. art. 26(2)(c).
95. Id. art. 25.
96. Id. art. 25(3).
97. Id. arts. 25(1), 25(2).
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ments in domestic law, the treaties tend to follow patterns corre-
sponding to the periods when they were negotiated. Roughly
speaking, there are four principal "periods".
The first general U.S. tax treaty - after certain limited pur-
pose treaties, chiefly governing the taxation of shipping profits -
was with France, signed in 1932.9' The principal purpose of this
treaty was to mitigate the broad territorial reach of French taxa-
tion of U.S. business enterprises operating in Paris. The treaty did
not deal generally with many of the subjects covered by the 1927-
28 League models. It contained rules governing only income from
government service, war pensions, private pensions and annuities,
royalties and business profits. The treaty contained no provisions
concerning administrative cooperation or exchange of information,
and none governing nondiscrimination.
Much broader was a treaty signed by the United States with
Sweden in 193999 and a new treaty signed in the same year with
France. 100 The Swedish treaty was ratified in 1940, but the French
treaty, which replaced the 1932 treaty entirely, was not ratified un-
til the end of the Second World War. In these two treaties, the
United States established some important principles which have
remained cornerstones of U.S. tax treaty policy. The first was that
tax treaties should not generally affect taxation by the United
States of its citizens and residents. The second was the emphasis
given to administrative cooperation, particularly exchange of infor-
mation: this principle is in accord with the heavy emphasis on free
access to information that the domestic tax system lays on the col-
lection process.
In 1942 the United States signed a general treaty governing
double taxation and administrative cooperation with Canada.101
This treaty differed from the 1939 treaties with France and Swe-
den in that it covered items of investment income: the French and
Swedish treaties did not apply, in particular, to interest income.
98. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Apr.
27, 1932, United States-France, 49 Stat. 3145 T.S. No. 885.
99. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Establishment of Rules
of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance in the Case of Income and Other Taxes, Mar. 23,
1939, United States-Sweden, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 11 7305-28.
100. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July
25, 1939, United States-France, T.S. 988.
101. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Mar.
4, 1942, United States-Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 1203.
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These treaties - with France, Sweden and Canada - re-
present our "early" period conventions. The 1939 treaty with
France was superseded by a new treaty signed in 1967,102 which
itself was subject to substantial revision by 197010 and 1978 proto-
cols. 1 04 The 1939 Swedish treaty was substantially revised by a
1963 protocol,105 but the treaty signed in 1939 is still in effect and
is our oldest. The 1942 Canadian treaty was substantially revised
in 1950;11° but it too is still in effect.
The "second period" of U.S. income tax treaties was in-
agurated with the 1945 treaty with the United Kingdom.0 7 This
treaty generally covered items of passive investment income, but
distinguished among particular categories of such income. Notably,
it provided for exemption of interest from tax at source.108 The
treaty was regarded as a major advance for the United States be-
cause of the United Kingdom's acceptance of broad exchange of
information and administrative cooperation provisions. This treaty
was substantially revised by a protocol negotiated in 1966,109 and
was ultimately replaced by a new treaty signed in 1975110 and en-
102. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July
28, 1967, United States-France, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518, reprinted in 1 TAx TREA-
TiEs (CCH) 2803.
103. Protocol to the Convention of July 28, 1967, with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Property, United States-France, Oct. 12, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 7270 reprinted
in 1 TAx TaaArms (CCH) 2839.
104. Protocol to the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property,
United States-France, Nov. 24, 1978, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 9500, reprinted in 1 TAx
TREATiES (CCH) I 2836A.
105. Convention Supplementing the Convention and Protocol of Mar. 23, 1939, United
States-Sweden, Oct. 22, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 1824, T.I.A.S. No. 5656 reprinted in 2 TAx TRFA-
TiES (CCH) I 7328A.
106. Convention Modifying and Supplementing the Convention Accompanying the
Protocol of March 4, 1942 for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion in the Case of Income Taxes, United States-Canada, June 12, 1950, 2 U.S.T.
2235, T.I.A.S. No. 2347.
107. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 16, 1945, United States-United Kingdom, 60
Stat. 1377, T.I.AS. No. 1546, reprinted in 2 TAx TRATIES (CCH) 8106-29.
108. Id. art. XV.
109. Supplementary Protocol Amending the Convention of April 16, 1945, as Modi-
fied, for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 17, 1966, United States-United Kingdom, 17 U.S.T. 1254,
T.I.A.S. No. 6089, reprinted in 2 TAx TR&mris (CCH) I 8131A.
110. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, United States-
United Kingdom, 80 Dm'r. STATE BuLL. (No. 2038) 70 (May 1980), 2 Tx TREATmS (CCH)
8103A-CC.
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tered into force in April of 1980.111 The original treaty remains in
force, however, with approximately fifteen jurisdictions with re-
spect to which it was extended, with modifications, in 1958.112
The first United Kingdom treaty established a model for U.S.
treaties negotiated between the end of World War II and the com-
mencement of double tax treaty work by the OEEC and, later, the
OECD. During this period we negotiated treaties with most of the
states of the developed world, including twelve treaties with Euro-
pean countries (the United Kingdom,113 the Netherlands,"11  Den-
mark,11 5 Norway,11 6 Ireland,117 Greece,118 Switzerland,1 9 Italy,120
Germany,12 ' Austria, 2 2 Finland,12 s and Belgium 24); four with non-
European developed countries (South Africa, 25 Australia,2 Ja-
111. Id., entered into force April 25, 1980.
112. See note 132 infra.
113. See note 107 supra.
114. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, Apr. 29,
1948, United States-Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855, reprinted in 2 TAx TREA-
TIES (CCH) M7 5804-32.
115. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, May
6, 1948, United States-Denmark, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854, reprinted in 1 TAx TREA-
TIES (CCH) V 2103.
116. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, June 13, 1949, United States-
Norway, 2 U.S.T. 2353, T.I.A.S. No. 2358, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) %7 6104-25.
117. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Sept.
13, 1949, United States-Ireland, 2 U.S.T. 2303, T.I.A.S. No. 2356, reprinted in 1 TAx TREA-
TIES (CCH) 4103.
118. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Feb.
20, 1950, United States-Greece, 5 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 2902, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) % 3103.
119. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, May
24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316, reprinted in 2 TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 1 7403-23.
120. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Mar.
30, 1955, United States-Italy, 7 U.S.T. 2999, T.I.A.S. No. 3679, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 4303.
121. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July
22, 1954, United States-Germany, 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No. 3133, reprinted in 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 1 3003.
122. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Oct.
25, 1956, United States-Austria, 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. No. 3923, reprinted in 1 TAx TREA-
TIES (CCH) 1 503.
123. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Mar.
3, 1952, United States-Finland, 3 U.S.T. 4464, T.I.A.S. No. 2595, reprinted in 1 TAX TEA-
TIES (CCH) 2703.
124. Convention for the Aviodance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Aug.
7-Sept. 9, 1952, United States-Belgium, 4 U.S.T. 1647, T.I.A.S. No. 2833, reprinted in 1 TAx
TREATIES (CCH) T 587.
125. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July
15, 1952, United States-South Africa, 3 U.S.T. 3821, T.I.A.S. No. 2510, reprinted in 2 TAx
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pan, i"7 and New Zealand1 28); and one with a developing country
(Pakistan12 9 ). The treaties with Japan and Finland were super-
seded by new treaties in the early 1970's.130 The treaties with the
United Kingdom and Belgium were also superseded, insofar as the
developed country treaty partner is concerned, 131 but remain in
force with respect to territories or former territories of those coun-
tries. 1 2 And several other treaties of this period have been sub-
stantially revised by protocol.3 s
The treaties nogotiated in this general period cover the basic
range of subjects in the present OECD and U.S. models, although
there are omissions in some of them. But the content of some of
these treaties often differs from what we would seek today. Among
these differences, the most important concerns the typical "busi-
ness profits" article. Before 1966, domestic law made the United
States a "force of attraction" jurisdiction - i.e., if a foreign person
was engaged in trade or busin ess in the United States, all his U.S.-
source income was subject to tax, regardless of whether the income
was attributable to the business; and we taxed none of that per-
son's foreign-source income even if, in an economic sense, such in-
TREATIES (CCH) 1 7903-21.
126. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, May
14, 1953, United States-Australia, 4 U.S.T. 2274, T.I.A.S. No. 2880, reprinted in 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 1 403.
127. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Apr.
16, 1954, United States-Japan, 6 U.S.T. 149, T.I.A.S. No. 3176, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 4403.
128. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Mar.
16, 1948, United States-New Zealand, 2 U.S.T. 2378, T.I.A.S. No. 2360, reprinted in 2 TAX
TREATIES (CCH) 11 5903-25.
129. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July
1, 1957, United States-Pakistan, 10 U.S.T. 984, T.I.A.S. No. 4232, reprinted in 2 TAX TEEA-
TIES (CCH) 6203-23.
130. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Mar.
6, 1970, United States-Finland, 22 U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042, reprinted in 1 TAx TREA-
TIES (CCH) 1 2651; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to In-
come, Mar. 8, 1971, United States-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365, reprinted in 1
TAX TREATIES (CCH) 4393.
131. Agreement Amending the Convention of Dec. 31, 1975, Apr. 13, 1976, United
States-United Kingdom, 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 8103CC; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July 9, 1970, United States-Belgium, 23 U.S.T.
2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 587.
132. Agreement Relating to the Application of the Income Tax Convention of April 16,
1945 to Specified British Territories, Aug. 19-Dec. 3, 1958, United States-United Kingdom,
9 U.S.T. 1459, T.I.A.S. No. 4141, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 8103.
133. See, e.g., Protocol Supplementing the Convention of December 13, 1946, July 15,
1952, United States-South Africa, 3 U.S.T. 3821, T.I.A.S. No. 2510.
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come was attributable to the U.S. business. 134 In accordance with
this statutory law, most of our treaties from this period provided
that permanent establishments could be taxed in a source state on,
and only on, income arising in the source state. When we changed
our law in 1966,135 in addition to relieving non-"effectively con-
nected" income from U.S. tax, we also subjected to tax "effectively
connected" income having a foreign source.13 6 The existing treaties
undermine the current statutory pattern of taxation, because by
statute we no longer tax the non-"effectively connected" U.S.-
source income - even though we have the right to do so by treaty
- while the treaties preclude us from applying our domestic law to
tax "effectively connected" income of foreign source.
Most of the treaties of this period allow a person earning real
property income in the United States the right to elect annually to
be taxed on a "net basis" - i.e., at progressive rates and with de-
ductions - rather than at the gross °(30%) rate applicable in the
absence of such an election. The Internal Revenue Code has per-
mitted such an election since 1966, but that election is irrevocable
unless consent to change is given 'by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice.13 7 Treaty provisions permitting the election to be made on an
annual basis create certain tax avoidance opportunities for persons
investing in U.S. real property.
Most of these treaties also concede the right of the United
States to impose its "second dividend" and "second interest" taxes
- the taxes we apply to dividends and interest paid by foreign
corporations doing substantial business in the United States. Most
contain personal service articles different in significant detail from
those we would seek today; few contain the special provisions now
included in U.S. treaties governing the earnings of artists and ath-
letes. Most have exchange of information and mutual agreement
provisions that are more restrictive than those we like to negotiate
now. Most have imprecisely-drafted provisions governing the
mechanism for crediting "source country" taxes. Most contain pro-
visions conferring benefits upon teachers, which we no longer view
as appropriate. Although many of these treaties have been modi-
134. The "force of attraction" rules were originally enacted as 211(b) and 231(b) of the
Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648. They were carried forward in the same section
numbers of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and later as sections 871(c) and 882(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
135. P.L. 89-909, § 102, 80 Stat. 1541-i543 (1966).
136. I.R.C. § 864(c); Trees. Reg. § 1.864-3 - 1.864-5 (1972).
137. I.R.C. § 871(d); Tress. Reg. § 1.871-10 (1974).
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fled by subsequent protocols or new treaties, many outdated provi-
sions continue in force.
This "second period" of the U.S. tax treaty program also wit-
nessed the entering of a tax treaty relationship with smaller coun-
tries. Under some conventions negotiated between European
states, a treaty could be extended to territories of one of the par-
ties by notice given through diplomatic channels to the other
party. Our 1945 treaty with the United Kingdom 3 8 contained such
a "teritorial extension" provision, as did several other treaties
signed shortly after the Second World War. In the process of seek-
ing ratification of those treaties, however, understandings were
reached between the Executive Branch and the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee that no such extension would be effected with-
out separate ratification of each extension by the Senate. In 1955,
pursuant to a request by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
United States for the first time extended a tax treaty to an over-
seas territory of a treaty partner: the Netherlands Antilles.39 In
1957, the Belgian treaty was extended to three Belgian territories
which are now Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire.1 40 In 1958, the United
Kingdom treaty was extended to 20 overseas territories of the
United Kingdom. 41
At the same time, the United States, under the Eisenhower
Administration, inaugurated a program of negotiating tax treaties
which included a "tax sparing" provision. Many developing coun-
tries have, in the past and at present, relied upon special tax in-
centive legislation to attract foreign investment. The idea of "tax
sparing" developed in the 1950's. Under this concept, a developed
country would agree by treaty to give a credit not only for taxes
imposed by a developing country, but for taxes which would have
been imposed in the absence of tax holiday legislation. This idea
won widespread support among business groups interested in the
double taxation problem, such as the National Foreign Trade
138. See note 107 supra.
139. Protocol Supplementing the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Certain Other Taxes for the Purpose of Facilitating Extension to the Netherlands Antilles,
June 15, 1955, United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366, reprinted in 2
TAX TREATIES (CCH) I 5832A.
140. Agreement Relating to the Extension of the Operation of the Income Tax Con-
vention of 1948, as supplemented to the Belgian Congo and the Trust Territory of Ruanda-
Burundi, July 28, 1959, 10 U.S.T. 1358, T.I.A.S. No. 4280, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 7 504.302.
141. See note 132 supra.
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Council and the International Chamber of Commerce.,. 2
When the first U.S. treaty with such a provision - the treaty
with Pakistan 48 - was submitted to the Senate for ratification,
the "tax sparing" idea was greeted with hostility by the Foreign
Relations Committee. The Senators emphasized the traditional
view of U.S. tax treaties - that they did not reduce or affect the
tax burdens of United States persons - and that tax sparing was
obviously a departure from this principle.4 While the Pakistan
treaty was under consideration, however, Pakistan repealed its tax
incentive legislation, which mooted the treaty provision."45 Never-
theless, the Committee, in reporting the treaty favorably, entered a
reservation to the tax sparing provision,'146 and the treaty was ap-
proved by the Senate subject to the reservation."4 Three other
treaties with tax sparing provisions - with India, the United Arab
Republic, and Israel - were never reported out by the Committee.
The third group of U.S. treaties comprises those twelve trea-
ties in force that were negotiated since 1960, but prior to publica-
tion of the U.S. model treaty in 1976. Of these, six (Luxembourg, 48
France, 4 e the United Kingdom,'50 Japan,' 5' Belgium, 52 Iceland, 53
and Finland'") are with OECD countries; two (Korea, 55 Trinidad
and Tobago15 6 ) are with Free World developing countries; and
142. See, e.g., Double Taxation Conventions, Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-23 (1957).
143. See note 129 supra.
144. See Double Taxation Convention with Pakistan, Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1957) (statement of Professor
Stanley Surrey).
145. S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
146. Id.
147. 104 CONG. REC. 13242-44 (1958).
148. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Dec.
18, 1962, United States-Luxembourg, 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726, reprinted in 1 TAx
TREATIES (CCH) % 5303.
149. See note 102 supra.
150. See note 131 supra.
151. See note 130 supra.
152. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July
9, 1970, United States-Belgium, 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I.A.S. No. 7463, reprinted in 1 TAx TREA-
TIES (CCH) 587.
153. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, May
7, 1975, United States-Iceland, 26 U.S.T. 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 8151, reprinted in 1 TAx TREA-
TIES (CCH) 1 3703.
154. See note 130 supra.
155. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, June
4, 1976, United States-Korea, T.I.A.S. No. 9506, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 4803.
156. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of International Trade
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three (the USSR,15 7 Poland,158 and Romania' 59) are with Commu-
nist countries. In addition, the United States during this period
negotiated significant protocols to some of the earlier treaties -
notably those with Germany,160 Sweden,161 and the Netherlands.1 6 2
Several features distinguish these treaties from those of the
prior period. With the exception of the quite unusual treaty with
the USSR, these treaties tend to follow closely the structural for-
mat of the international model; but they contain special provisions,
found neither in the earlier treaties nor in the OECD model, re-
flecting a unique approach by the United States. The most impor-
tant of these provisions are those dealing with "general rules of
taxation" and source of income. The general rules of taxation pro-
vide, typically, that the treaty is not to restrict any allowances,
credits, or deductions permitted under domestic law; and that a
contracting state is permitted to tax the income of a resident of the
other contracting state only to the extent that income is from
sources within the first state. The source provision includes de-
tailed rules governing when income is deemed to arise in the source
state; these rules, which typically expand to some extent upon the
and Investment, Dec. 22, 1966, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, 18 U.S.T. 3091, T.I.A.S.
No. 6400, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 7603-07, terminated December 31, 1969,
superseded by Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the Encouragement of International Trade
and Investment, Jan. 9, 1970, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S.
No. 7047, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 7608-37.
157. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income, and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the Elimination of Obstacles to
International Trade and Investment, June 20, 1973, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 27 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 8225, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 8002B-2Q.
158. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 8, 1974, United States-Poland, 28 U.S.T.
891, T.I.A.S. No. 8486, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 7003-29.
159. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income, the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the Elimination of Obstacles to Inter-
national Trade and Investment, Dec. 4, 1973, United States-Romania, 27 U.S.T. 165,
T.I.A.S. No. 8228, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) IV 7254-82.
160. Protocol Respecting the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 17, 1965, United States-Federal Re-
public of Germany, 16 U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. No. 5920, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH)
3015.
161. Protocol Respecting the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 22, 1963, United States-Sweden, 15
U.S.T. 1824, T.I.A.S. No. 5656, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 7328.
162. Protocol Respecting the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 23, 1963, United States-Netherlands,
15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) I 5832B.
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"source" rules set forth in the Internal Revenue Code,163 are
designed to guarantee that the classification and assignment of
substantive taxing rights will avoid double taxation in practice.
This "third period" of U.S. tax treaties saw another significant
development in regard to U.S. tax relations with developing coun-
tries. Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the Trea-
sury did not negotiate treaties with "tax sparing" provisions, be-
cause it viewed those provisions as creating an artificial bias in
favor of foreign investment over domestic investment. In 1962,
however, Congress adopted a statutory investment tax credit
which, by its terms, was available only for investments in property
placed in service in the United States. 64 The Treasury, by treaty
with developing countries, agreed to allow a similar credit for prop-
erty placed in service in the developing country treaty partner,165
and treaties containing such provisions were signed with Thai-
land," 6 Brazil,167 Israel, 1 6 and the Philippines.16 9 This provision,
too, was found unacceptable by the Foreign Relations Committee,
which viewed the investment tax credit as designed to spur domes-
tic investment and domestic employment, and which regarded it as
inappropriate to extend the measure by treaty to stimulate foreign
investment.17 0 Of the treaties which contained an investment tax
credit feature, the Committee reported only the one with Brazil,
subject to a reservation on this point; the Senate approved the
treaty subject to the reservation,1 7 1 but the treaty never entered
into force.
163. I.R.C. §§ 861-864.
164. P.L. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 962 (1962). The restriction on the availability of the
investment tax credit for property placed in service outside the United States is codified at
I.R.C. § 48(a)(2)(A).
165. See notes 166-69 infra. None of the four treaties listed infra has yet entered into
force.
166. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 1, 1965, United States-Thailand, reprinted
in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 11 7503-33.
167. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Mar.
13, 1967, United States-Brazil, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) T 803.
168. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Nov. 20, 1975, United States-Israel, reprinted in
1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 4202.
169. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 1, 1976, United States-Philippines, re-
printed in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 11 6603-33.
170. See, e.g., Tax Convention with Thailand, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-04 (1965) (remarks of
Senator Gore).
171. See note 165 supra.
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The fourth group of U.S. treaties are those based more firmly
on the 1976 U.S. model 17 2 and the revised version of that model
published in 1977.173 Only one treaty currently in force, with Hun-
gary, 74 falls in this group. But there are numerous treaties cur-
rently in the process of negotiation, translation, signature, or ratifi-
cation that would fall in this group as well.
B. The U.S. Model
The point of reference for all United States income tax treaty
negotiations undertaken today is the U.S. model income tax treaty,
which follows the OECD model in most important respects. Issued
publicly for the first time in December 1976,175 the model was reis-
sued, with relatively minor modifications, in May 1977.176 Although
some U.S. negotiating positions have changed since 1977, a new
version of the model has not yet been issued. We attempt to take
developments into account in actual negotiations.
The most important differences between the U.S. model and
that of the OECD are as follows.
Citizenship basis taxation. The OECD model applies only to
states which tax globally on the basis of domicile or residence. 77
We, of course, tax on a citizenship basis in addition to a residence
basis.1.7 We regard it as appropriate to attempt to relieve double
taxation which occurs when a nonresident U.S. citizen is taxed on
a source basis by a treaty partner. In addition, the U.S. model con-
tains a "saving" clause permitting taxation of U.S. citizens (includ-
ing former citizens) as if no treaty were in effect.179 Since this rule
is overbroad in certain respects, it is necessary to accompany the
saving clause with specific exceptions.
Coverage of state and local taxes. Under the U.S. model, state
and local taxes are not covered, except for the nondiscrimination
172. U.S. Treasury, Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, U.S. Treas.
Press Release, May 18, 1976.
173. U.S. Treasury, Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty of May 17,
1977, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 153 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Model].
174. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Feb. 12, 1979, United States-Hungary, T.I.A.S. No.
9560, reprinted in 1 Tx TREATIES (CCH) 1 3603.
175. U.S. Treasury, Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, U.S. Treas.
Press Release, May 18, 1976.
176. U.S. Model, supra note 173.
177. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
178. I.R.C. § 1; Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(a)(1) (1954).
179. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 1(3).
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article.18 0 The OECD model provides for general coverage of the
taxes of a political subdivision or local authority.,"
Corporate residence. The United States treats place of incor-
poration as the test of corporate residence,182 and the U.S. model
reflects this statutory rule. 83 Some other countries use a "managed
and controlled" test. 18 The OECD model provides that when a
corporation is, under the domestic law of the contracting states,
deemed a resident of each state, its residence is determined by the
place where its "effective management" is situated.1, 5 The U.S.
model resolves such cases on the basis of place of incorporation.186
Interest exemption. The U.S. model contains a reciprocal ex-
emption of interest at source.18 7 The OECD, in contrast, grants a
right to the source state to tax at a rate not in excess of 10
percent.188
Investment of holding companies. The U.S. model contains a
provision not found in the OECD model, denying reductions of
source basis taxation when a corporation of the other state is
largely owned by nonresidents of that state and benefits in that
state from special tax measures.18 9 This provision, which places the
United States at the forefront of the international effort to prevent
treaty abuse, requires further thought and refinement.
Elimination of double taxation. The U.S. model contains de-
tailed provisions for relief from double taxation, and an explicit
assurance of a foreign tax credit for taxes covered.1 90 Source rules
are provided to permit the classification and assignment of sub-
stantive taxation rights to operate effectively. The model does not
extend relief for the deemed paid credit below the first foreign
subsidiary."1
Beyond these fundamental differences between the models lies
a wide range of other differences. Some are merely matters of style,
although an effort has been made to minimize differences without
substance, for the sake of facilitating negotiations. An additional
180. See id. art. 2.
181. See note 54 supra.
182. I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(4), 7701(a)(5); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-5 (1954).
183. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 4(1).
184. This is the test of "corporate residence" employed by the United Kingdom.
185. OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 4(3).
186. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 4(3).
187. Id. art. 11(1).
188. See OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 11(2).
189. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 16.
190. Id. art. 23(1), 23(2).
191. See id. art. 23(1).
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list of significant points in the U.S. model would include at least
the following.
Penalty taxes. The model does not cover the accumulated
earnings tax and the personal holding company tax.19 2 We wish to
ensure that United States persons do not evade these penalty taxes
through the formation of corporations in treaty countries.
Excise taxes on insurance premiums and private foundations.
The U.S. model covers these taxes,193 on the theory that they are,
in effect, imposed in lieu of income taxes. In cases where the other
country has similar taxes, we would insist upon reciprocity.
Coverage of taxes for non-discrimination and exchange of in-
formation provisions. The U.S. model covers all taxes, including
state and local taxes, for purposes of the non-discrimination arti-
cle.194 It covers all national level taxes for purposes of the exchange
of information article.19 5 The first of these provisions represents a
strong United States position against discriminatory tax measures.
Since there is a long tradition in the United States of state adher-
ence to standards of non-discrimination, we attempt to secure
comparable coverage by the treaty partner. With respect to ex-
change of information, we believe that since a treaty relationship is
to be established, the broadest possible provisions for information
exchange are desirable; but even if this notion is unacceptable to
the treaty partner, at a minimum we wish to obtain sufficient in-
formation to permit the treaty to operate, even if the information
was obtained by the treaty partner under a national level tax not
generally covered by the treaty.
Trusts and partnerships. Unlike the OECD model, the U.S.
model contains rules ascribing a state of residence to trusts and
partnerships. 96 These rules are intended to permit the treaty to
operate in circumstances that are relatively common in United
States practice.
Remittance basis. Reductions in source basis taxation are gen-
erally not justified in the face of rules in the residence state
preventing taxation of the benefited income. Many countries -
particularly countries previously forming part of the Common-
wealth of the United Kingdom - provide by law that residents
will not be taxed on income which is not remitted to the country.
192. Id. art. 2(2). See I.R.C. §§ 531-537, 541-547.
193. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 2(2).
194. Id. art. 24(6).
195. Id. art. 26(6).
196. Id. art. 4(1).
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The U.S. model denies reductions in source basis taxation in such
circumstances. 197
Construction projects. The model provides that a construction
project will not be considered a permanent establishment, and thus
subject to taxation at source, until it lasts for more than 24 months
in the source state.198 This provision reflects the U.S. position as a
net exporter of construction services. The comparable OECD pro-
vision is 12 months; 19 the UN model prescribes a period of 6
months.2 00
Net basis election for real property. The U.S. model, reflect-
ing statutory law,20 1 permits a taxpayer to elect to be taxed on real
property income on a net basis. 2  This rule is included in the
model to ensure that the other state will allow similar net basis
taxation. We are prepared to delete this rule when we are satisfied,
through negotiations, that the statutory law of the other state per-
mits such taxation.
Allocation of expenses to permanent establishment. The U.S.
model contains more detailed rules than the OECD model gov-
erning the allowance of deductions in the source state for expenses
borne by a home office on behalf of the entire enterprise.2 03 This
provision is designed to reflect United States rules governing allo-
cations of expenses to foreign source, as opposed to domestic
source, income.20
4
Definition of business profits. The U.S. model contains a rule
defining business profits, and making clear that rentals of tangible
personal property and income from the licensing of films and
broadcasting rights come within the definition.05 We seek a defini-
tion of business profits because the OECD model is ambiguous in
regard to certain kinds of income. We prefer to classify film and
broadcast income, and income from the leasing of tangible prop-
erty, as business income, because this classification ensures taxa-
tion at source, if there is to be such taxation, on a net basis. The
197. See id. art. 4(6).
198. Id. art. 5(3).
199. OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 5(3).
200. United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and De-
veloping Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, art. 5(3) (1980) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Model].
201. See note 137 and accompanying text supra.
202. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 6(5).
203. Id. art. 7(3).
204. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8 (1978). See Benvignati, Treasury Regulation § 1.861-8 and
Research and Development Expenses: An Economic Evaluation, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 493 (1981).
205. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 7(7).
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expenses associated with these kinds of income can be high. In
contrast, the OECD model classifies these types of income as royal-
ties, but provides for exemption at source.20 6
Expanded definition of shipping and air transport income.
The U.S. model expands the concept of income from international
shipping and air transport to cover the rental of ships, aircraft, and
containers used in international transport. 7 We believe that the
income from such activities is essentially similar to income from
international shipping and air transport, and that the policies dic-
tating a separate provision for the latter types of income apply
equally to the former.
Direct investment dividends. The U.S. model provides for a
maximum rate of 5 percent for source basis taxation of dividend
income derived by a corporation owning 10 percent or more of the
voting stock of the company paying the dividends.208 The compara-
ble rule in the OECD model provides for a maximum 5 percent
rate when the payee corporation owns 25 percent or more of the
capital of the company making such payments.209 The U.S. prefer-
ence for a 10 percent ownership test is designed to mesh with U.S.
statutory law governing the deemed paid foreign tax credit.210
Second withholding taxes. The U.S. model permits the United
States to impose its "second withholding taxes" on dividends and
interest paid by a foreign corporation deriving income from the
United States.211 These rules are particularly important in negotia-
tions with a country having a "branch profits" tax.
Royalties. The U.S. model provides that royalties include
gains contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of rights
or property.21 2 This rule corresponds roughly with U.S. statutory
law.213
Capital gains on the disposition of shares in a real property
holding organization. This is one respect in which our current ne-
gotiating practice deviates from the model. Under both our
model214 and the OECD model,215 a source country may tax capital
206. See note 68 supra.
207. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 8(2).
208. Id. art. 10(2).
209. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
210. I.R.C. §§ 902, 960.
211. See U.S. Model, supra note 173, arts. 10(2), 10(5), 11(6).
212. Id. art. 12(2).
213. I.R.C. § 1235(a).
214. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 13(1).
215. See note 70 supra.
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gains on real property. But an investor may avoid source state tax-
ation by incorporating a holding company to own the property.2 16
This device will not insulate operating income from current taxa-
tion, but it may be effective for avoiding source taxation of capital
gain on sale of the shares, which may well reflect appreciation in
the value of the underlying property.
United States statutory law does not generally tax foreign in-
vestors on gains from the disposition of shares in corporations
formed to hold real property. In connection with the Revenue Act
of 1978, however, legislation was proposed which would have taxed
gains from the disposition of shares in a company formed to hold
U.S. farmland.21 7 In the 96th Congress, more far-reaching legisla-
tion has been introduced which would tax foreign investors on
their gains from the disposition of shares in real property holding
organizations - entities formed to hold any U.S. real property.218
The legislation has had broad congressional support; and the Trea-
sury has supported the general idea behind it.
In the face of these developments, we have modified our treaty
policy and now seek a provision granting reciprocal rights to source
state taxation of capital gains on the sale of shares in corporations
formed for the sake of holding real property situated in that state.
Independent personal services. The U.S. model allows source
basis taxation when a person is present in the source state for more
than half of a taxable year.2 19 This provision, which derives from
U.S. statutory concepts, 220 is similar to the dependent personal ser-
vices provisions in both the OECD221 and the U.S. models.222 It is
intended to supplement the "fixed base" rule which the OECD
model uses exclusively for independent services223 and which is
sometimes difficult to administer.
Directors' fees. The U.S. model contains no separate article on
this subject, reflecting the view that directors' fees should be taxed
as independent personal services or dependent personal services, as
216. See U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 13(4).
217. The proposal led to the adoption of section 553 of the Revenue Act of 1978, P.L.
95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, under which the Treasury Department was required to submit a re-
port to Congress concerning the proper manner of taxing gains realized by foreign persons
from foreign investments in United States property.
218. This legislation has since been passed. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, P.L.
96-499, Foreign Investment in United States Real Property, 94 Stat. 2682.
219. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 14.
220. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(2).
221. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
222. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 15(2).
223. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
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the case may be. Many other countries have special statutory rules
for directors' fees, because such fees are not deductible by the pay-
ing corporation. They are, in effect, considered a distribution of
corporate profits.
Artists and athletes. The OECD model provides that the state
where services of an artist or athlete are rendered may tax the in-
come from such services without limit.2 24 It also provides that
where income from such services is diverted to another person, the
source state may tax without regard to the existence of a perma-
nent establishment or fixed base. 2 The U.S. model, in contrast,
contains a "threshold" limiting source state taxation when an art-
ist or athlete has not recieved remuneration in excess of $15,000 in
the taxable year.226 It also limits the special rule on source state
taxation of diverted income to cases where the performer has an
interest in the recipient entity.227
Social Security payments. The OECD model reserves to the
residence state the right to tax pensions, including benefits paid
from a public social security fund.228 The U.S. model provides for
exclusive taxation of social security and other public pensions at
source.229 Since the United States does not tax Social Security ben-
efits,230 and has geared benefit levels accordingly, we seek to ensure
that our benefit structure will not be impaired by taxes imposed by
the other state.
Annuities, alimony, and child support. The U.S. model con-
tains specific provisions, missing from the OECD model, to deal
with these items of income.23 With respect to annuities and ali-
mony, the U.S. model provides for exemption in the source state.232
With respect to child support, the model - reflecting U.S. statu-
tory law, which does not provide for taxation of such payments2"3
- provides for exemption in both states.23 '
Government service. The U.S. model follows the OECD model
in this article,23 5 except that it contains a rule treating the spouse
224. OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 17(1).
225. Id. art. 17(2).
226. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 17(1).
227. Id. art. 17(2).
228. See note 78 supra.
229. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 18(1).
230. LR.C. § 61; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-11 (1965).
231. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 18(2), 18(4).
232. Id. art. 18(2), 18(3).
233. I.R.C. § 71(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(e) (1960).
234. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 18(4).
235. Id. art. 18. Compare OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 19.
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or dependent child who begins to render government service after
moving abroad like the spouse who moved abroad for the purpose
of rendering such service.2 6 In addition, the U.S. model provides
that a citizen rendering government service will generally be
treated as a resident of the sending state for all purposes under the
treaty.23 7
Students. The U.S. model provides an election for a student
to be treated for tax purposes as a resident of the state in which he
is studying.238 This provision is intended to permit the student to
take advantage of statutory allowances and exemptions available
only to residents. A person who makes such an election is required
to pay tax on his worldwide income to the United States.23 9
Non-discrimination. The U.S. model covers discrimination
against nonresidents but provides that, in effect, nonresident aliens
will not be entitled to net basis taxation in the United States.24 In
addition, the model provides a relatively detailed rule governing
the allowance of indirect expenses as deductions in the source
state.21 In these respects the U.S. model extends principles found
in the OECD model. On the other hand, the U.S. model 242 - un-
like the OECD model - provides no protection against discrimina-
tion by the source state for corporations not having a permanent
establishment in that state.
Mutual agreement. The U.S. model provides for no time limit
on the period in which a case can be presented to the competent
authority, and spells out in detail some of the actions which are
permissible for the competent authority to take.243 We think it
helpful to provide as much guidance to the competent authority as
possible. Many countries, which have more flexible competent au-
thority mechanisms than the United States, do not perceive the
need for such rules, which are not found in the OECD model.
Exchange of information and administrative assistance. The
U.S. model provision on exchange of information is broader than
that of the OECD. It expressly requires a state of which informa-
tion is requested to take depositions, and engage in other specified
information-gathering activities, on behalf of the requesting
236. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 19(1).
237. Id. art. 4(5).
238. Id. art. 20(2).
239. Id.
240. Id. art. 24(1).
241. Id. art. 24(4).
242. See note 91 supra.
243. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 25(2), 25(3).
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state. 44 The U.S. model is intended to produce information in a
form that will be useable in U.S. courts. It also contains a provision
requiring the residence state to collect taxes on behalf of the
source state for the purpose of ensuring that relief granted by the
source state does not inure to the benefit of persons not entitled to
such relief.245 This feature is aimed at combatting the use of nomi-
nees to secure unintended advantages under a treaty.
Territorial extension. The U.S. model contains no provision
like that of the OECD modeP 48 governing territorial extensions.
Since territorial extensions must be independently ratified in the
United States, a territorial extension provision is of no effect and,
indeed, can be misleading.
C. Other Issues
The U.S. and OECD models are, of course, blueprints for only
the issues commonly faced in treaty negotiations. There are many
treaty issues which do not fit within the confines of the models.
These issues arise either from special features in the other coun-
try's law or in our own, or from the status of the treaty partner -
as a developing country, for example. As might be expected, these
are some of the most serious and controversial issues we confront.
Imputation systems. In recent years a number of developed
countries have modified their pattern of taxing corporate earnings
in order to mitigate "double taxation" at the corporate and share-
holder levels. This "integration" of corporate and shareholder tax-
ation has taken a variety of forms. In some countries, distributed
profits are taxed at a lower rate than undistributed profits.247 In
others an "imputation" system is used. 48 Imputation means that
part or all of the tax charged to the corporation is allowed as a
credit to the shareholder when profits are distributed as a divi-
dend; the shareholder includes in income both the dividend and
the amount of creditable tax, and claims a credit against his indi-
vidual liability for the tax paid by the corporation.
Imputation itself has various manifestations. Some countries
have adopted "compensating" taxes at the time of a distribution,
or at the time of a distribution of previously untaxed profits, to
ensure that the shareholder credit is funded by taxes paid by the
244. Id. art. 26(3).
245. Id. art. 26(4).
246. OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 28.
247. See id. art. 10, Commentary, paras. 39-42.
248. See id. paras. 43-54.
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corporation.249 Some countries allow shareholder refunds when the
credit at the individual level exceeds the shareholder's tax liabil-
ity.2 50 Some countries have combined split rate systems with an
imputation feature.2 5 Some countries impute only a relatively
small portion of corporate level taxes to the shareholder. 52 Some
countries maintain substantial residual taxes at the shareholder
level.2 53 The variations on this theme are many and complex.
In most cases, however, imputation countries, by their domes-
tic law, do not accord the shareholder tax credit to nonresidents.
Nonresident shareholders are ordinarily taxed at a flat percentage
of the dividend. Imputation systems thus place our investors at a
disadvantage, in terms of access to capital, by comparison with in-
vestors who are residents of the imputation country. We have
sought in treaty negotiations to secure benefits for U.S. investors
commensurate with the imputation benefits granted to source state
investors. This may involve "imputation credits", or some substi-
tute for them, for our residents who make equity investments in
such countries. The issue gives rise to controversy and complexity
in current negotiations.
Tax sparing. A major issue, in negotiating with developing
countries, concerns "tax sparing", the grant by the state of resi-
dence of a tax credit for taxes that would have been charged in the
source state but are not because of special tax relief or "tax holi-
day" provisions. The position of developing countries is now as it
was two decades ago: that tax holidays are in their national inter-
est and that without tax sparing a credit country such as the
United States - which allows the credit only for foreign taxes ac-
tually paid - counteracts the tax holiday legislation and itself col-
lects the tax "spared".
We think it inappropriate to use tax treaties to favor foreign
investment over domestic investment. Moreover, given the history
of this issue, we believe that a treaty reflecting a different view
would be unlikely to achieve ratification.
Source basis taxation in developing countries. The OECD
and U.S. models are, as indicated, designed primarily for treaties
249. The systems adopted by Germany, the United Kingdom, and France exhibit this
feature.
250. See OECD Model, supra note 39, art. 10, Commentary, paras. 45-46 (French,
British, and Turkish systems).
251. See id. para. 54.
252. The system adopted by Denmark exhibits this feature.
253. The system adopted by Denmark exhibits this feature as well.
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between countries where the flows of income and capital are rough-
ly reciprocal. The limitations of source state taxation in those
models produces a revenue cost for that state. However, when in-
vestment flows are more or less reciprocal, the revenue sacrifices
more or less offset each other. In a treaty between a developed and
a developing country the flows are largely in one direction: income
flows from the developing country to the developed country. Thus,
a model which is in form reciprocal in fact can impose a substan-
tial revenue burden on a developing country.
The UN guidelines,2" which contain a more expanded source
basis of taxation, 55 recognize the need of developing countries to
conserve revenues. The shift is, however, tempered by the often
conflicting need of developing countries to attract capital, an ob-
jective which is best served by limited source basis taxation.
Permanent Establishment Definition and Business Profits.
The UN guidelines include an expanded definition of the perma-
nent establishment concept.256 It permits taxation by the source
state if an enterprise maintains a stock of goods for delivery in
that state;257 or if it has an agent there who regularly makes deliv-
eries on behalf of the enterprise.2 58 It permits a limited "force of
attraction" of nonattributable income at source.259 And it contem-
plates source taxation of a foreign enterprise engaged only in
purchasing in the source state.260
Shipping. The UN guidelines contain an optional provision al-
lowing source state taxation of shipping activity which is more
than casual, even if that activity is conducted by an enterprise
managed outside that state's borders.26 1
Investment Income. With respect to dividends, interest, and
royalties the UN guidelines provide for a positive rate of taxation
at source, but do not fix the maximum rate; 6 2 the participating
developing countries believed the OECD rates - 5 percent on di-
rect investment dividends, 15 percent on portfolio dividends, 10
percent on interest, and zero on royalties2 63 - were too low. With
254. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 52.
255. Id. at 7-12.
256. Id. at 14-24.
257. Id. at 19-20.
258. Id. at 20-21.
259. Id. at 25.
260. Id. at 29-30.
261. Id. at 31-36.
262. Id. at 37-57.
263. Id. at 38, 43, 50-51.
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respect to capital gains, the UN guidelines reserve the right of the
source state to tax shares representing a substantial participation
in a company engaged in business within that state.6 4
Personal Service Income. The UN guidelines treat managerial
salaries as taxable in the state of a company's residence, regardless
of where.the managerial services are performed.265 They contain an
option to allow source state taxation of pensions.26 6
Other Income. The UN guidelines limit residual residence
state taxation to income from sources in the state of residence or
from third countries; the source state is permitted to tax residual
income arising, under its own laws, in that state.28 7
The United States has long recognized that items that would
likely be exempt at source in a developed country treaty may be
taxable at source in a treaty with a developing country. In negoti-
ating with developing countries we have sought primarily to shift
items that such countries might prefer to tax on a gross basis into
net basis taxation, since we believe net basis taxation to be both
fairer and more reasonable than gross basis taxation. These points,
of course, imply a broadened definition of "permanent establish-
ment" in treaties with developing countries, and this coincides
with a basic thrust of the UN guidelines.
The United States has also been prepared to accept relatively
low thresholds for taxation of services income at source. And we
have accepted relatively high source taxation of passive income in
developing country treaties, focusing more on the practical need to
avoid excess foreign tax credits than on the theoretical preference
for residence basis taxation of such income.
As a very general matter, therefore, many of the UN guide-
lines appear acceptable as they stand, or with relatively minor revi-
sions. We intend to draw heavily upon them in producing internal
guidlelines for use in negotiations with developing countries.
Foreign tax credit. In June 1979 the Internal Revenue Service
issued proposed regulations setting forth standards for determin-
ing when a payment to a foreign government constitutes an "in-
come tax", or a tax in lieu of an income tax, creditable against U.S.
tax liability under the Internal Revenue Code.2 8 These standards
264. Id. at 25.
265. Id. at 61.
266. Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and De-
veloping Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA94, at 85, Guideline 18B(2) (1979).
267. Id. at 89, Guideline 21(3).
268. These Regulations have been redesignated as "temporary" since the delivery of
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would preclude credits in the case of certain taxes which are
viewed, or at least labeled, as "income taxes" by the governments
imposing them.2 69 The regulations have doubtless highlighted
questions regarding the extent to which tax treaties should, and
do, guarantee foreign tax credits for the taxes they cover. These
questions are especially acute with respect to payments to foreign
governments in connection with the exploitation of natural re-
sources. It is our present policy to accord a treaty credit for cov-
ered taxes, and in some cases this implies a credit in cases where
there may be doubt regarding the application of the statute. In
such cases of doubt we believe the treaty credit should be limited
so that it will have no effect for source state credits exceeding the
tentative U.S. liability with respect to income arising in that state.
State taxation using the unitary apportionment method.
The "arm's length" method of apportioning profits among compo-
nents of an integrated international enterprise has been the inter-
national standard since the 1930's. Within the United States,
among states, a "unitary apportionment" method is still widely
used. Many foreign countries have strongly objected to this
method of state taxation when it is applied to foreign controlled
corporate groups. They have argued that the method results in
taxing more profits than are attributable to activities conducted
within a state, and that it requires a burdensome amount of infor-
mation about an enterprise's worldwide operations.
Third country use. Most United States treaties allow benefits
in the nature of reductions in source basis taxation to corporations
organized in the treaty partner, regardless of whether the owners
of the corporation are residents of, or are in any other way con-
nected with, that country.270 Any treaty conceivably can, therefore,
be used to effect an overall change in the incidence of United
States taxation of U.S. source income, by the simple formation of a
"holding company" qualifying for treaty benefits. If a person, for
instance, holds equity securities subject to our 30 percent with-
holding tax on dividends, he can normally reduce that tax by or-
ganizing a corporation in a country with which we have a treaty
these remarks. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 4.901-2, 4.903-1 (1980).
269. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 4.901-2 (1980).
270. See, e.g., Agreement for Relief From Double Taxation on Earnings From Opera-
tion of Ships and Aircraft, Aug. 7, 1964, United States - Mexico, 15 U.S.T. 1528, T.I.A.S.
No. 5635; Understanding Relating to Exemption of Shipping and Aircraft Profits, Nov. 30,
1971, United States - Japan, 22 U.S.T. 1775, T.I.A.S. No. 7216; Convention for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July 22, 1954, United States-Germany, 6
U.S.T. 1065, T.I.A.S. No. 3245.
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reducing the rate to 15 percent.
In practice, however, this kind of "third country use" of tax
treaties does not routinely arise, because it is ordinarily not cost-
free to make investments through a holding company specially or-
ganized in a treaty partner. Most treaty partners of the United
States will tax income received by the corporation, which ordina-
rily will eliminate any advantage from the reduction of the U.S.
rate at source. To the extent the investor will be subject to with-
holding tax on payments from the corporation, or to the extent he
is not able to claim complete relief in his home country for a divi-
dend from a foreign corporation, the additional tax burden will
often exceed the benefits achieved under the treaty with the
United States.
This protection of the treaty process depends, however, on the
existence of normal taxing provisions in the law of the treaty part-
ner. Some of our treaty partners have special provisions granting
privileges to holding companies, which result in reduced taxation
of the holding company or reduced taxation on the payment of in-
come from the treaty country to a third country.17 1 Sometimes this
occurs for reasons of domestic policy, but sometimes the treaty
partner has deliberately enacted provisions with the aim of at-
tracting "offshore" business, with an eye to the revenues that can
be collected from licensing fees or those taxes which are imposed;
and to the service industry that can be built up around an "off-
shore" financing business.
In addition, treaties can be used to channel benefits to "third
country" beneficiaries through the use of "conduit" companies.
This practice depends upon an exemption from source basis taxa-
tion of payments from that country, and an hospitable attitude to-
ward "offshore" business. The conduit company earns income in
the United States which is subject, under the treaty, to reduced
U.S. tax; the income is then siphoned off as payments deductible
from the base subject to tax in the treaty partner, to the person
who is the real investor.
These "treaty shopping" practices are objectionable for a
number of reasons. The practices cause unintended revenue loss,
not contemplated by the treaty "bargain". They may undermine
the willingness of third countries to enter into treaty negotiations
with us. And, perhaps most seriously, such practices are contrary
to the spirit of international double tax treaties, and enhance op-
271. E.g., Netherlands Antilles Profits Tax Ordinance of 1940, arts. 14-14A.
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portunities for international tax evasion. Double tax treaties are
founded on the principle of allocating taxing rights based on "eco-
nomic allegiance"; 7 2 treaty shopping accords a revenue power to a
third country, the "base country", which has little or no claim to
such allegiance. In addition, since most "base countries" have local
law provisions which ensure confidentiality of the identity of the
ultimate investor, the conclusion is inescapable that the practices
are employed to a large extent by persons evading taxes in their
home country.
Within the last two years we have initiated negotiations aimed
at modifying three treaties which we believe present treaty shop-
ping problems - with Switzerland, the Netherlands Antilles, and
the British Virgin Islands.2 7 3 Our objective in these negotiations,
generally, is to secure new provisions that will eliminate or materi-
ally reduce the potential for abuse.
There are potential statutory solutions to the "treaty shop-
ping" problem. Congress could enact a law denying benefits under
income tax treaties to corporations disproportionately owned by
third-country interests, or to income used to a disproportionate ex-
tent to satisfy third-country claims. Switzerland has a law like
that,274 but it is aimed at persons using Switzerland as a base coun-
try to derive income from countries with which Switzerland has tax
treaties, not at persons earning income in Switzerland. 27 5 Such leg-
islation by the United States would require careful assessment.
Statutory override of treaty bargains has a disruptive effect on our
entire treaty program, if not on our foreign relations generally.
Moreover, a blanket denial of benefits to corporations controlled
by third country residents would undoubtedly cut too broadly
since our principal difficulties stem only from a few treaties with
countries which have chosen to foster an "offshore" business as a
deliberate policy. Such legislation might deny benefits to arrange-
ments having legitimate business purposes.
272. See text accompany note 6 supra.
273. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on In-
come, May 24, 1951, United States - Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316; Protocol
to the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes for the Pur-
pose of Facilitating Extension to the Netherlands Antilles, June 15, 1955, United States -
Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366; Agreement Relating to the Application of the
Income Tax Convention to Specified British Territories, Aug. 19, 1957, United States -
United Kingdom, 9 U.S.T. 1459, T.IA.S. No. 4141.
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Coverage of possessions. A number of our negotiations have
raised the question of treaty coverage of U.S. possessions. At pre-
sent, none of our treaties in force applies to any of the possessions.
The possessions have income tax systems which are separate from
the U.S. system, although the law in force in many of them is the
Internal Revenue Code as "mirrored"; and in others, the law is
closely patterned on our internal tax law. We generally believe that
covering the possessions is a salutary idea, because it secures the
protections of a treaty for possessions residents who wish to invest
or otherwise earn income abroad, and it may contribute to in-
creased investment in the possessions. However, under present law,
coverage of the possessions would, as a practical matter, require
the negotiation of "mini-treaties", and the possessions to date have
not clearly expressed interest in undertaking such an effort.
III. MANAGEMENT OF THE TREATY PROGRAM
The questions of what U.S. tax treaty policy "is" and how it is
formulated ultimately depend, of course, not only upon what the
models or the treaties in force provide, or what view we take in the
abstract about particular issues, but also upon our methods of con-
ducting bilateral negotiations. This raises a host of questions about
the "management" of the treaty program: how we formulate or re-
vise provisions of the U.S. model; how we determine which coun-
tries we will negotiate with; how negotiations are actually con-
ducted; and finally, how treaties in force are administered.
Design of the U.S. model treaty. The most important decision
that has been made in designing the U.S. model was to adhere as
closely as possible to the OECD model. The discussion to this
point indicates the basic justification for this approach: the OECD
model represents an appropriate, if not perfect, theoretical basis
for tax treaty negotiations; it evolved in a pragmatic way; and it
offers the best chance of achieving the maximum degree of interna-
tional tax harmonization, the reduction of tax-based barriers to the
free movement of goods, persons, and capital across borders, with
appropriate protections against international tax evasion. In light
of the widespread international acceptance of the OECD model,
any other choice would, in many cases, make the achievement of
treaties impossible. These considerations have prevailed in the de-
sign of the U.S. model, despite the fact that much of the language
used in that model" is not found in the Internal Revenue Code; that
some of the concepts of the OECD model are relatively unfamiliar
as well; and that, in certain respects, we believe that substantive
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rules in the OECD model stand in need of improvement.
Those departures we have made from the OECD model are
not generally motivated by differences in economic theory or dif-
ferences in our view of the practical requirements of international
tax cooperation. The only major exceptions to this statement are
the reciprocal interest exemption 27 and the investment and hold-
ing company provisions. The interest exemption does reflect a
consistent U.S. preference for a stricter "residence" basis approach
to taxing liquid international capital which moves freely from
country to country; but the approach we pursue is at least implic-
itly conceded by the commentary to the OECD model. The invest-
ment and holding company provisions are, we believe, essential at-
tributes of a modern bilateral treaty; but here again, the
commentary acknowledges the validity of our position, and we are
currently pursuing discussions at the OECD aimed at devising a
common international view of treaty abuse. In general, if we be-
lieve a deviation from the OECD model is warranted based not on
some peculiar circumstance of our position but because of deficien-
cies in the OECD approach, it is advisable to raise the question at
the OECD, in an attempt to secure modification of the interna-
tional model.
In general, most of the deviations we have made from the
OECD model are an outgrowth of peculiar features of U.S. law. It
is not necessarily true that our statutory practices in these regards
are optimal, but treaties are intended to function against a back-
drop of domestic law.
Finally, we are prepared to deviate from the OECD model in
some instances in anticipation of changes in U.S. statutory law. Or-
dinarily, we would not deem it wise to change treaty policy in an-
ticipation of statutory changes, because the changes might never
occur. But we are conscious of the fact that treaties remain in ef-
fect for substantial periods of time, and are not subject to easy
revision once they enter into force. Thus, when we perceive a like-
lihood that legislation will be enacted, and a difficulty with existing
treaty policy if it is enacted, and when we view the potential legis-
lation and the treaty policy changes as essentially sound, we are
probably wisest to anticipate the legislation and modify our negoti-
ating policy as appropriate.
Selecting Treaty Partners. In cases where another country re-
276. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 11.
277. Id. art. 16.
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quests treaty negotiations with the United States, we are usually
disposed - subject to scheduling constraints - to comply. Nor-
mally, we try to establish at the outset some of the ground rules
under which we want negotiations to take place. For example, we
forward a copy of the U.S. model in advance, sometimes accompa-
nied by an explanation of its particular features; and we endeavor
to make clear the United States position in regard to tax sparing
and other incentives for foreign investment. Generally we indicate,
in regard to treaties in existence, that we prefer not to negotiate
exclusively for the purpose of changing a single provision. Existing
treaties almost invariably stand in need of general updating, and if
we are to meet we generally prefer a full review.
Insofar as United States initiated negotiations are concerned,
it is best to distinguish between countries with which we already
have a treaty and countries with which we seek a treaty for the
first time. With respect to the former category, the most important
instance where we might request negotiations would be where the
treaty arrangement is producing unintended consequences. A lead-
ing example would be those treaties which give rise to extensive
treaty shopping. Another case for U.S. initiated negotiations would
be where significant changes in a treaty partner's law have under-
mined the functioning of the treaty or have altered the bargain
represented by the treaty. An example would be our treaty ar-
rangement with Italy, which has completely altered the tax system
covered by the treaty in force.
A third case would be where a change in our own law has af-
fected the operation of the treaty. Of necessity, we are slower in
initiating renegotiation of treaties in this case, since changes in our
law typically leave us with a host of treaties requiring revision. For
example, the United States has not concertedly sought renegoti-
ation of treaties to reflect changes brought about by the Foreign
Investors Tax Act of 1966;278 over time, however, we have entered
into negotiations, because of other circumstances to revise at least
half of those treaties; in these negotiations we have undertaken the
necessary process of modernization. A systematic program to revise
outdated treaties is on our agenda, but it does raise serious
problems with the allocation of our staff resources.
A fourth case of U.S. initiated negotiations would be where
Congress by statute overrode provisions of our treaties. This has
278. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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occurred only rarely; the best known example was a provision of
the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966279 which overrode our estate
tax treaty with Greece, 80 which was then renegotiated.2 81 Congress
has now enacted legislation to tax foreign investors on their capital
gains from sales of United States real estate,282 and the legislation
by its terms would override inconsistent treaty provisions after a
five year delay.2 8 Our hope is that, in that five year period, we
could negotiate protocols with the various countries with which we
have treaties that would be subject to the override.
With respect to countries with which we have no treaties, we
make it clear that we stand ready to negotiate but ordinarily do
not urge any particular country to commence negotiations. We
generally make the point that a tax treaty has substantial value,
because it establishes fiscal relations between the two countries
and because it represents an indication to private investors of the
existence of a stable climate for investment. We normally do not
press particular countries to negotiate, because it has been our ex-
perience that negotiations have the best chance for success where
the other country comes on its own to recognize the desirability of
a treaty relationship.
The treaty bargaining process. In the process of bilateral bar-
gaining, there are issues on which the U.S. and OECD models dif-
fer, where we are asked to make concessions in the direction of the
OECD model; there are issues where we are asked to agree to a
provision contrary to both models; and there are novel questions
on which the models are silent.
With respect to movement in the direction of the OECD
model, and movements away from both the U.S. and OECD mod-
els, there are some issues we never concede, and some where we
must make a judgment based upon the overall balance of the
treaty bargain. We do not concede, for example, on citizenship ba-
279. Id.
280. Convention and Protocol for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on the Estates of Deceased Persons, Feb. 20,
1950 (Protocol, July 18, 1950), United States - Greece, 5 U.S.T. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 2901; Proto-
col Modifying and Supplementing the Convention of February 20, 1950, for the Avoidance
of Taxation, Feb. 12, 1964, United States - Greece, 18 U.S.T. 2853, T.I.A.S. No. 6375.
281. Protocol Modifying and Supplementing the Convention of February 20, 1950, for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on the Estates of Deceased Persons, Feb. 12, 1964, 18 U.S.T. 2853, T.I.A.S. No. 6375,
reprinted in 1 TAx TREATmS (CCH) 3168.
282. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-499, Foreign Investment in
United States Real Property, 94 Stat. 2682.
283. Id. § 1125(c).
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sis taxation; protecting provisions of U.S. law intended as penal-
ties; noncoverage generally of state and local taxes; protection
against at least some forms of discrimination; and the U.S. statu-
tory rule regarding corporate residence.28 4 These are issues where
we perceive a strong national interest reflected in the U.S. model.
While we might make a concession on at least some of these issues
in certain circumstances without serious impairment of our inter-
ests, we prefer not to establish precedents clearly contrary to the
model on these questions. We believe each treaty represents a sep-
arate bargain, and do not grant concessions simply because they
have been granted in other negotiations. Nevertheless, in practice
it is sometimes difficult to convince another country that we have
good reason for not accepting a provision that we have accepted
elsewhere.
On the other hand, there are provisions in the U.S. model
which are different from those of the OECD model but to which we
do not ascribe great significance. For example, the rules for resolv-
ing cases of dual residence of individuals are different in our model
from those proposed by the OECD. We believe our rules are better
than those of the OECD, but the differences are of little practical
importance and we have been prepared to adopt the OECD rules.
Between these extremes lie a wide range of issues which must
be considered on a treaty-by-treaty basis. The factors we normally
take into account in making the necessary judgments are the prac-
tical importance of a concession to the United States and U.S. tax-
payers; the provisions of foreign law that will be operative if the
concession is made; the degree to which a particular concession
might be regarded as a precedent for other negotiations; and the
difficulties that a particular concession might create for the ratifi-
cation process.
With respect to issues not covered by existing models, our ob-
jective in seeking agreement is frequently not conformity to princi-
ple but the establishment of a principle itself. Issues regarding the
imputation credit 85 are of particular difficulty precisely because
what is involved for both countries is the establishment of a new
principle. Eventually, of course, whatever principle is embodied in
the treaties will, in some form, find its way into the work of inter-
national organizations, since that work has always been not so
284. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 531-537, 541-547, 891, 896, 7701(a)(4), 7701(a)(5). See also U.S.
Model, supra note 173, art. 2 (omitting personal holding company, accumulated earnings,
and state and local taxes from coverage), 24 (non-discrimination).
285. See text accompanying notes 248-54 supra.
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much a process of formulating abstract rules as of elaborating rules
established, more or less, by usage. Because of the size and eco-
nomic importance of the United States, we have special responsi-
bilities in this regard; often when a new and serious international
problem arises, like that created by the imputation systems, other
countries will await the outcome of our negotiations before pursu-
ing their own. These considerations can make bilateral negotia-
tions over new issues very difficult.
Particular negotiations may raise special issues not covered, or
not covered in sufficient detail, by the models. For example, dis-
cussions of information exchange with bank secrecy countries, and
discussions of treaty shopping with tax havens, have made these
negotiations unique. In these discussions we are not aiming at es-
tablishing or clarifying fiscal relations between two countries, but
at solving a serious problem for the tax system. Just as we have
fundamental concerns involved, the other country has concerns
which it views as equally fundamental. In the best of circum-
stances the "trade" made in such negotiations involves a compro-
mise which improves the situation for both sides, without requiring
ultimate concessions by either.
Implementing tax treaties: the "competent authority" func-
tion. Under all tax treaties, certain powers and duties are dele-
gated to the "competent authorities" of the contracting states.
Under the U.S. model, and under our treaties in force, the term
"competent authority" is the Secretary of the Treasury or his dele-
gate;288 in practice, the Secretary has delegated this responsibility
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,287 who in turn has dele-
gated day-to-day responsibilities to the Assistant Commissioner
(Compliance) of the Internal Revenue Service.288 On matters in-
volving legal interpretations of treaties, the Assistant Commis-
sioner (Compliance) is enjoined to seek the concurrence of the As-
sistant Commissioner (Technical).289
The treaties spell out a number of assignments of the compe-
tent authority. The typical "mutual agreement" article states that
a taxpayer may appeal to the competent authority of the state of
which he is a resident or national, if he believes he is being sub-
jected to taxation not in accordance with the treaty.290 The treaties
286. U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 3(1).
287. Treas. Dept. Order No. 150-83, 1973-2 C.B. 508.
288. Delegation Order 114 (Rev. 2), 1980-43 I.R.B. 22.
289. Id.
290. See U.S. Model, supra note 173, art. 25(1).
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authorize the competent authorities to agree to a definition of a
term not defined in the treaty if an agreement on a common mean-
ing is necessary or desirable.2" 1 In addition, the treaties make the
competent authorities responsible for conducting the information
exchange permitted or required under the treaties.2 92 The compe-
tent authorities are authorized to communicate directly for the
purpose of discharging their responsibilities. 93 This provision is
necessary to obviate the need for using diplomatic channels to ef-
fect communication between the two contracting states.
One issue with respect to the implementation of our treaties
grows out of the manner in which responsibilities for conducting
the treaty program and implementing treaties are divided within
the Treasury Department. The Internal Revenue Service is not, in
general, responsible for the conduct of treaty negotiations; that
function is reserved to the Treasury's Office of Tax Policy. Of ne-
cessity, however, the Service is assigned the task of handling the
"competent authority" process. The most important reason for this
is that the Service is in possession of the information which an-
other country would be likely to request pursuant to a treaty, and
knows what information the United States might need. In addi-
tion, the Service has the prime responsibility for handling individ-
ual tax cases.
Public and congressional participation in the treaty negotiat-
ing process. One final problem touching on the management of the
treaty program concerns the difficulty of engaging Congress and
the public in the process of formulating treaty law. Treaty negotia-
tions are conducted on a government-to-government basis, and the
provisions of a treaty are not revealed publicly until after a treaty
is signed. This means that outside interested parties do not have a
full opportunity to comment upon, or to participate in, the devel-
opment of the provisions that will be included in the treaty; the
treaty is presented as a fully negotiated document when it is trans-
mitted by the President to the Senate for advice and consent.
We have taken several steps in recent years to mitigate this
problem. In 1976 we published the U.S. model, calling for public
comments. The model represents our initial negotiating position;
through its publication we intended to apprise the public of our
objectives in treaty negotiations, and we have, in fact, received sig-
291. See id. art. 25(3).
292. See id. art. 26(1).
293. See id. art. 25(4).
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nificant comments on the model. Second, we have undertaken in
recent years to announce publicly at least the outset of treaty ne-
gotiations; and, as of 1978, for negotiations showing promise of
leading to treaties, we have held public meetings to discuss the ma-
jor issues and the negotiating positions of the United States. In
order to do this, we must obtain the consent of our negotiating
partner; and often we are constrained, at the request of other
countries, in what we may publicly discuss. Most other countries
with which we have negotiated treat the negotiating process as
strictly secret. For this reason we have generally declined, in our
public meetings, to divulge details regarding positions taken by the
other country. Nevertheless, we do manage, through these meet-
ings, to alert the public to most of the major issues in the negotia-
tions, and we have frequently received useful comments and sug-
gestions as a direct result.
Finally, the ratification process ensures full public participa-
tion after the signature of a treaty, but before it enters into force.
If a provision is found objectionable to the Senate, there is ordina-
rily opportunity to reopen the negotiations to change the provision,
although this process may involve making collateral concessions to
the treaty partner.
In general, it is difficult to see a way to avoid restrictions on
public participation in the treaty negotiating process. Other coun-
tries typically insist upon some degree of confidentiality for the ne-
gotiations. Moreover, fully discussing our negotiating positions, the
importance that each has for us, our reasons for them, and the like
would tend to undermine our own position in the negotiating pro-
cess. This would have the effect of prolonging negotiations gener-
ally, and would inevitably result in less favorable bargains for the
United States than we might otherwise be able to obtain.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, United States tax treaty policy is founded upon
established international principles and practices, accommodated
to reflect the special characteristics of our tax system. The essen-
tial long-range objectives of the tax treaty program are to eliminate
the impediments that double taxation, or the threat of double tax-
ation, might pose to the international flow of goods, capital, and
persons, and to establish fiscal relations between the United States
and other nations. In pursuing these objectives, we are sometimes
forced to agree to compromise provisions that are not ideal, and to
accept rules governing transactions with one country which may be
1981)
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [19:359
different from those governing similar transactions with another.
But if one considers the difficulties of making accommodations
with the multitude of varying tax systems in the world today, the
value of tax treaties to international economic activity clearly
makes them worth these relatively small costs.
For the moment, the major short-term objectives of United
States treaty policy are three-fold. First, we must update and mod-
ernize our treaties presently in force. This process will eventually
eliminate some of the irregularities of the extant pattern of treaty
law. Second, we must revise those few treaties which give rise to
abuse, for the sake of the integrity of the tax system and to ensure
that the treaty program does not result in an unjustified loss of
revenue to the United States. Finally, we need to work to expand
our treaty network, particularly with developing countries. These
objectives are serious and important, and they deserve a high pri-
ority. We are devoting to them as much time and effort as we can.
